INTRODUCTION

This dissertation was submitted in part fulfillment of the assessment requirements for the award of LL.B (Hons.) Law by the University of Lincoln in April 2008.

Abstract: 

In the light of landmark legal cases during 2006/7, which have greatly broadened the original ruling from Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 289, and which have gone some way towards reversing the judgement in Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No.6); sub nom Douglas v Hello! Ltd (trial action: breach of confidence) (No.3) [2003] EWHC 786, can we now say that everyone has the right to privacy and confidentiality, thereby extending the conflict between Article 8 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights?

And if so, where does this leave Media Law in relation to the Human Rights Act 1998 and freedom of expression?

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation was submitted in part fulfillment of the assessment requirements for the award of LL.M. International Law by the University of Lincoln in September 2017.

Abstract: 

For the principles encapsulated within this work to be accepted, it will assumed throughout that the events of 2 May 2011 in Abbottabad, Pakistan resulted in the capture, arrest and subsequent detention of Osama Bin Laden by forces answering to the Government of the United States of America, and that they were acting within International Law on behalf of World Justice, and with the intention of bringing him to trial.

The object of this work is three-fold:

Firstly to explore the general legal issues that would have faced any international criminal court when called upon to stage such a trial. Contrary to popular belief, a trial of this nature is extremely rare, with so very few of history’s political leaders ever succumbing to such scrutiny. In modern times we need only think of the despots who have, for various reasons, escaped or avoided international trial: Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin, Mao Tse-Tung, Muammar al-Gaddafi, Pol Pot, Kim Il-sung and his son, Kim Jong-il, Idi Amin, Augusto Pinochet, François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier and his son Jean-Claude, Nicolae Ceaușescu and Francisco Franco. In only three cases – thus far – has a political leader been brought to trial on the international stage for the acts that they are alleged to have committed: Saddam Hussein (former President of Iraq), Radovan Karadžić (as President of Republika Srpska, even though that Proto-State was unrecognised by the international community), and Slobodan Milošević (former President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia). At the time of writing, the international courts are still dealing with the case of Charles Taylor (former President of Liberia). In each of these cases it was absolutely vital to the outcome of the trial that the initial legal process was seen have legitimacy, and that the defendant(s) received a fair trial.

Secondly then, in the wake of so few historic examples to follow, the purpose of this work is to hopefully provide some level of enlightenment for future legal generations as to the choice of jurisdiction and thirdly, the legal mechanisms that may be employed to bear upon those political leaders who remain, thus far, outside the realms of international justice. It is not too late to consider the cases of Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Bashar al-Assad (Syria), and Kim Jong-un (North Korea) for whom the future may yet hold legal ramifications for the acts that they have already committed, or will commit in years to come. I accept that it could be argued the case of Osama Bin Laden should not be considered in the same vein as the list of political leaders outlined above, after all he was not the leader of any recognised State. I have carefully considered this argument, and would counter it by saying this: Osama Bin Laden was globally acknowledged as the leader and mastermind of the organisation known as al-Qaeda, and upon his given or inferred instructions, terrorist activities were subsequently carried out in his name by groups and individuals all over the world, much of which may have directly given rise to the formation of Islamic State (ISIS) or ‘Daesh’.

Thirdly, this work also highlights a new Human Rights issue which has until now, gone virtually unnoticed – that of the ‘de jure statelessness’ individual, and the Human Rights issues surrounding them.

It is therefore upon these three legal grounds, that I shall address the case of Osama Bin Laden… at trial

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation was submitted in part fulfillment of the assessment requirements for the award of LL.M. International Law by the University of Lincoln in February 2018.

Abstract: 

The object of this work is three-fold: Firstly to explore the legal issues surrounding the question of whether or not so-called ‘targeted killing’ can ever satisfactorily defined and/or justified?

Secondly, in the light of modern technology development (drones), where the decision making process can be entirely automated – ‘taking the finger off the trigger’ – I will examine the use of remote targeted killing, and the ethical and moral questions of whether the human element should ever be completely removed from the decision to strike.

Thirdly, with international law currently in no position to either determine or even guide State behaviour with respect to targeted killings, is it likely that such acts will become the Norm in international counter-terrorism practice? If so, should the international legal community take this opportunity to provide more defined guidelines on the legitimate use of targeted killing?

Upon these three grounds, I shall address the question of whether targeted killing can ever be legally justified.